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ABSTRACT:
Introduced in 2016, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code overhauled
the Indian insolvency regime. Five years young, the Code is now in the
process of adopting the Cross-Border insolvency, which was omitted from
its original mandate. In 2018, a legislatively appointed committee suggested
that the Code should adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border
Insolvency. However, the Committee overlooked a crucial jurisprudential
guideline, which colored the interpretation of the Model Law. It was a crossborder insolvency dispute between American and German regimes. An
American bankruptcy court subjected to the German administration of
American Intellectual Property assets to protection exclusively available
within the American Bankruptcy Code. This paper studies the American
judicial decisions in the Samsung v. Jaffe dispute to identify and underline
the importance of its directive. The study reveals that there is virtually no
guidance on how an intellectual property license is treated within the Indian
insolvency regime. The authors underline the importance of such guidance
considering the proposed adoption of the Model Law and suggest legislative
inquiry in the issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 2016, the Indian insolvency and bankruptcy regime remained
multilayered and fragmented.1 In response to decades of suggestions for an
overhaul of the insolvency regime, 2 the Indian Parliament enacted an
umbrella legislation for insolvency resolution: The Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC, 2016). IBC, 2016 reformed India’s insolvency
regime by substituting the multitude of operational bankruptcy laws, some
of which dated as far back as 1924.3 The Code introduced a creditor-incontrol regime, a time-bound resolution process, and reduced the scope of
juridical intervention.4
While the Code has been touted as “one of the most progressive
financial reforms in recent times,”5 it was not designed to deal with issues
related to cross-border insolvency. The first draft of IBC, 2016, was prepared
by The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC), set up by the Ministry
of Finance to reform the Indian bankruptcy Regime.6 The BLRC explicitly
noted that their recommendations are limited to insolvency and bankruptcy
in so far as it is a “purely domestic issue.”7 When the bill was presented
before the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), they disagreed with the
BLRC. The JPC noted that the Code must incorporate some manner of
regulating cross-border insolvencies, “not incorporating this will lead to an
incomplete code.” Deliberating on the manner of regulation, the JPC
included an enabling mechanism on the suggestion from the Department of
Economic Affairs, Government of India. The mechanism empowered the
Central Government to enter into bilateral agreements with other countries
for cooperation in cases of cross-border insolvencies.8
1. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION & INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY BOARD OF INDIA,
UNDERSTANDING THE IBC: KEY JURISPRUDENCE AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION 11–12 (2020).
2. VIDHI CENTRE FOR LEGAL POLICY, UNDERSTANDING THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY
CODE, 2016 11 (2019); Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India & Others, 4 SCC 17
(2019).
3. See Sreyan Chatterjee, Gausia Shaikh & Bhargavi Zaveri, An Empirical Analysis of the Early
Days of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, 30 NAT’L LAW SCH. OF INDIA REV. 89 (2018); Abhishek
Saxena & Akshay Sachthey, The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - A Fresh Start for India’s
Insolvency Regime, 10 INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING INT’L 22 (2016).
4. VIDHI CENTRE FOR LEGAL POLICY, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Neeti Shikha, Cross‐border insolvency in India: What lies ahead?, 30 INT INSOLVENCY REV.
163, 163–168, (2021).
6. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORM
COMMITTEE 5 (2015).
7. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS COMMITTEE, THE REPORT OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS
COMMITTEE VOLUME I: RATIONALE AND DESIGN 10–18 (2015); JOINT COMMITTEE ON INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2015, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY
CODE, 2016 43, 44 (2016). However, BLRC’s chairman acknowledged the importance of regulating
cross-border insolvencies. Referring to the UNCITRAL Model law, BLRC’s chairman, Mr.
Vishwanathan noted “we have not so far formalized our views because we want to put this Bill and the
court into action and then explore how best we should handle that.”
8. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §§234, 235 (India); JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2015, supra note 7, at 43–46; Shikha, supra note 5, at 163.

184

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 18:2

The enabling framework included in the IBC, 2016, encountered
various problems when issues related to cross-border insolvency were
brought to the attention of the Indian judiciary. In 2019, when JET Airways,
an Indian Airlines company, entered insolvency proceedings, it had assets in
two jurisdictions: India and Netherlands, and parallel insolvency
proceedings were initiated in both jurisdictions.9 Owing to the lack of a
robust cross border insolvency mechanism, the National Company Law
Tribunal (NCLT) in June 2019 declared that the Dutch proceedings are a
nullity in the eyes of the law.10 On appeal before the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), the insolvency professionals, on direction
from the NCLAT, entered into a ‘Cross-Border Insolvency protocol’ as a
temporary solution.11
The Jet Airways dispute underlined the requirement of a robust crossborder insolvency mechanism in India, and “an imminent need was felt to fill
the legislative gap.”12 The Insolvency Law Committee (“ILC”), constituted
by the Government of India had, in 2018, highlighted that IBC, 2016 does
not regulate cross border insolvencies and had approved the adoption of the
UNCITRAL Model Law within IBC, 2016. 13 The ILC did not deal with the
rules and regulatory framework which enables the implementation of the
Model Law. To prepare such a framework, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
constituted the Cross-Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee
(CBIRC) in January 2020.14 The Committee submitted its report on June 15,
2020,15 which was made publicly available on November 23, 2021.16
Apart from the judicial quandary, the linear growth of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in India also creates a strong argument favoring the

9. State Bank of India v. Jet Airways (India) Ltd., CP2205(IB)/MB/2019, NCLT, Mumbai (India),
order dated 20 June 2019; Sudhakar Shukla & Kokila Jayaram, Cross Border Insolvency: A Case to Cross
the Border Beyond the UNCITRAL, in INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA 307, 316-317
(2020).
10. State Bank of India v. Jet Airways (India) Ltd., CP2205(IB)/MB/2019, NCLT, Mumbai (India)
at 28-33. “Thus, even if the judgement of Foreign Court is verified and found to be true, still sans the
relevant provision in the I&B Code, we cannot take this order on record.”
11. Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India & Anr., 2019 SCC Online NCLAT 385 (2019);
Shikha, supra note 5, at 163; For details see Priya Misra, Cross-border Corporate Insolvency Law in
India: Dealing with Insolvency in Multinational Group Companies—Determining Jurisdiction for Group
Insolvencies, 45 VIKALPA 93, 98–100 (2020).
12. Shikha, supra note 5, at 163.
13. Insolvency Law Committee, Rep. of Insolvency Law Committee on Cross-Border Insolvency
(issued on Nov. 1, 2018) (India).
14. Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, Report on the rules and regulations for
cross-border insolvency resolution (Issued on June, 2020) (India).
15. Id.
16. Along with the Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee report, the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs in India also invited comments on the incorporation of the cross-border insolvency in
the IBC, 2016, see Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, Invitation of comments from
public on Cross-Border Insolvency under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Issued on Nov. 24,
2021) (India).

Summer 2022

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES

185

adoption of robust Cross-Border Insolvency guidelines.17 FDI Equity Inflow
in India between April 2000 and June 2021 was $547.2 billion. In 2016, India
witnessed an inward FDI of $39.97 billion, which rose by 26% to 50.61
billion in 2018.18 Even outward FDI from India has witnessed substantial
growth, from $8.18 billion in 2015-16 to $12.27 billion in 2018-19.19 With
the growing international investments and business transactions in India,
cross-border insolvency issues are expected to emerge, and adoption of cross
border insolvency law in some form seems imminent.
However, the introduction of cross-border insolvency regulations can
be accompanied by a compelling set of procedural and implementational
limitations. In and of itself, Insolvency Law is a meta law that, once
activated, supersedes otherwise applicable laws.20 Section 238 of the IBC,
2016, incorporates a comprehensive non-obstante clause. The provision
overrides the mandate of any other law if such mandate is contrary to the
provisions of the IBC, 2016.21
Therefore, domestic insolvency regimes are governed by an intersection
of a diverse mosaic of legal rules.22 A convergence of such diverse legal rules
can result in problematic conclusions. In 1985, the American Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit potentially disrupted the entire model of
monetizing intellectual property through licensing.23 The damage was so
pervasive that in 1988 the American Congress had to step in and denude the
1985 judgement from its precedential authority.24
Marked divergences between domestic insolvency regimes further
complicate such intersection and its implications in cross-border insolvency
cases.25 This is especially true in the case of Intellectual Property (IP)

17. See Morshed Mannan, Are Bangladesh, India and Pakistan Ready to Adopt the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency?, 25 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV., 195, 207 (2016). “This is not only
prejudicial to creditors, both domestic and foreign, but also stymies foreign direct investment and
undermines companies that may have the possibility of being rehabilitated.”
18. Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) from April 2000 to June 2021 (issued on June 2021) (India),
https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Factsheet_June2021.pdf.
19. Reji K Joseph, Outward FDI from India: Review of Policy and Emerging Trends (2019),
http://rgdoi.net/10.13140/RG.2.2.13229.23527.
20. John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed
Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1899–1902 (2006); Frederick Tung, Fear of
commitment in international bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555–583, 566 (2001).
21. See AKAANT KUMAR MITTAL, INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE: LAW AND PRACTICE
1295–1373 (2021).
22. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 450–472 (Jacques de Werra
ed. 2012).
23. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)
(1985); see James E Meadows, Lubrizol: What Will It Mean for the Software Industry?, 3 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 311 (1987).
24. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988).
25. Andrea Tosato, Intellectual Property License Contracts: Reflections on a Prospective
UNCITRAL Project, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2018); Werra, supra note 22.
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licenses, as there is no international guidance on the treatment of IP licenses
during bankruptcy.26 A classic example of this is the In Re Qimonda dispute.
In 2011, Qimonda, a manufacturer of semiconductor chips, filed for
insolvency before an insolvency court in Munich, Germany. When the
German trustee requested the administration of American assets, citing the
possible differences between German law and American law, an American
Bankruptcy Court subjected the relief to the explicit protections made
available to intellectual property licenses by the Congressional intervention
from 1988.27 The decision from the Bankruptcy Court and its affirmation by
the Court of Appeals in 2013 meant that the licensees of American patents
would enjoy a dramatically different treatment from the treatment afforded
to German licensees.28
The present study identifies the jurisprudential concerns highlighted in
the case of Samsung v. Jaffe.29 The interpretation of American bankruptcy
courts can substantially color the understanding of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, and therefore it deserves the attention of other insolvency regimes.
Further, the intersection of the American and German insolvency law
highlights the lack of any international guidance regarding the treatment of
IP licenses in bankruptcy. The authors analyze the treatment of IP licenses
within the Indian regime and its possible implications on the proposed crossborder insolvency regulations.
Part 1 of the present study explains the dispute and contextualizes it
within the scope of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Part 2 examines the pitfalls
of India’s existing cross-border insolvency regime and analyses the proposed
regulations in light of the current jurisprudence of the Model Law. Part 3
highlights the lack of a clear mandate on the treatment of IP licenses within
the international instruments guiding cross-border insolvency. Part 3 also
investigates the possible treatment of IP licenses in the IBC, 2016. Part 4
contextualizes the Qimonda dispute within Indian insolvency law and
highlights the need for an administrative study of IP licenses within the
Indian insolvency regime.

II. IN RE QIMONDA/ SAMSUNG V. JAFFE
In January 2009, Qimonda, a manufacturer of semiconductor chips,
initiated insolvency proceedings in Munich, Germany. Qimonda’s principal
assets comprised 10000 registered patents, 4000 of which were registered in
the USA. Given the existence of the bankrupt debtor’s assets in a foreign
26. Tosato, supra note 25, at 1255–1260.
27. 11 U.S.C. S. 365(n); See Stuart S. Moskowitz, Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy:
New “Veto Power” for Licensees Under Section 365(n), 44 BUS. LAW. 771, 771–790 (1989).
28. ELINA MOUSTAIRA, INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: NATIONAL LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL TEXTS 82-85 (Elina Moustaira ed., 2019).
29. The bankruptcy court has referred to the dispute as In re Qimonda, while the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit refers to this controversy as Samsung v. Jaffe. The authors have used these two
terms interchangeably.
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jurisdiction, the proceeding assumed the nature of cross-border insolvency.
The German trustee approached an American Bankruptcy Court to recognize
the German proceedings and administration of the American assets.
Before dealing with the particulars of the dispute and the judicial
decisions arising therefrom, this paper explains the underlying statutory
mechanism responsible for the dispute.
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES IN THE AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY
CODE
The American Bankruptcy jurisprudence has a controversial history of
dealing with IP licenses.30 Multiple American judicial decisions, academic
commentaries, and Congressional guidelines delineate the treatment of IP
licenses during bankruptcy. Most such guidelines and decisions traced their
connection back to Section 365 of the American Bankruptcy Code, which
allows a bankrupt debtor to reject onerous contracts entered into before the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings.31
Subjected to repeated criticism,32 Section 365 intends to release the
debtor from burdensome contractual obligations that impede successful
reorganization and liquidation.33Section 365 enables a bankruptcy estate to
incorporate the contractual arrangements which offer a net benefit while
contracts that can be detrimental to the estate are rejected.34 Rejection of
burdensome and onerous contracts reduces the prospective debts,35
increasing the funds available to the bankrupt business.36 The debtor can then
restructure these funds into payments towards creditors in case of liquidation
or reorganization.
While Section 365 is very broad in its ambit, the threshold requirement
for its application is that a contract must be ‘executory.’37 While the
American Congress has not defined the term, there is sufficient academic
and judicial opinion to create a workable definition.38 The most used and

30. Jason J. Kilborn, Technology and Regulatory Black Holes: Issues in Protecting IP Rights in
Insolvency for Both Licensors and Licensees, 18 QUT L. REV. 290, 291 (2018).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 365; For details, see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 365.02 (Richard B. Levin et al.
eds., 16th ed. 2009).
32. The power to reject executory contracts is “extraordinary and almost superhuman” Chapter 5:
Executory contracts and unexpired leases, in STEPHEN LUBBEN, AMERICAN BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: A
PRIMER 58–62 (2019); Section 365 proffers a radical departure from contract law. Lee Silverstein,
Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 468 (1964);
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding Rejection, 59 U. COLO. L. REV.
845, 849 (1988).
33. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-28 (1984); See also In re Orion Pictures Corp,
4 F.3d 1095, 1098 (2d Cir. 1993).
34. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, BAIRD’S ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 120–126 (5th ed. 2010).
35. James E. Meadows, Lubrizol: What Will It Mean for the Software Industry?, 3 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. J. 19, 316 (1987).
36. Id. at 316.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)
38. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 3.
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widely accepted definition39 was developed by Prof. Vern Countryman.
According to the Countryman Analysis,’ “a contract is executory if both
parties have sufficient unperformed obligations so that either party’s
discontinuance would constitute a material breach.”40
Most intellectual property (IP) licenses include continuing material
obligations41 and therefore qualify as executory contracts.42 In 1985, the
decision from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of
Lubrizol v. RMF 43 dramatically distorted the meaning of rejection in
reference to IP licenses. It led to an alarming disruption of the IP licensing
landscape.44
Richmond Metal Finishers had granted a non-exclusive patent licensing
agreement regarding a metal coating process to Lubrizol. When Richmond
filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 1983, they sought to reject the Lubrizol
license by placing reliance on Section 365. The Bankruptcy Court allowed
Richmond to reject the licensing agreement.45 On appeal, the District Court
held that the rejection would not benefit the bankruptcy estate and sided with
Lubrizol.46 The District Court opinion was overruled on appeal when the
Court of Appeals allowed rejection of Lubrizol’s license.47 In the court’s
opinion, a rejection under Section 365 would not only freed a licensor from
its prospective obligations but would also extinguish the licensee’s right to
continue using the licensed intellectual property.48 The court’s decision
effectively meant that rejection of an IP license during the licensor’s
bankruptcy would mean that rejection under Section 365 constitutes a
complete recission.49
The decision from the Court of Appeals effectually rendered all the
investments made by the licensee towards the exploitation of an intellectual
39. Lewis Bros Bakeries Inc v. Interstate Brands Corp (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp), 690 F.3d
1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 2012) (Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, The Countryman test is binding in
the eighth circuit); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib., 872 F. 2d. 36, 39 (3rd Cir. 1989), Wilson
v. TXO Prod. Corp., 69 BR 960, 962 (Bankr. ND Tex. 1987), Lewis Bros. Bakeries v. Interstate Brands
Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp.), 751 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2014), In re Exide Tech., 607 F.3d
957, 962 (3d Cir. 2010).
40. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974).
41. Benjamin Howard, Reconciling Trademark Law with Bankruptcy Law in License Rejection,
2014 COLUM BUS. L. REV. 172, 191 (2014); Amanda E James, Rejection Hurts: Trademark Licenses and
the Bankruptcy Code, 73 VAND. L. REV. 889, 895–96 (2020).
42. However, there are some cases where IP licenses were deemed not to be executory; For eg: Lewis
Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries Corp), 690 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th
Cir. 2012); In re Exide Tech., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010).
43. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d.1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
44. Michael J. Shpizner, Congress Passes New Legislation Protecting Licensees of Intellectual
Property, 30 IDEA1, 2 (1989).
45. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 BR 521, 526 (Bankr. ED Va. 1983).
46. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 BR 341, 345 (E.D. Va. 1984).
47. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d.1043, 1043.
48. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., supra note 43, at 1048; Alan Resnick, Sunbeam Offers a Ray of
Sunshine for the Licensee When a Licensor Rejects a Trademark License Agreement in Bankruptcy, 66
SMU L. REV. 817, 825-30 (2013).
49. James, supra note 41, at 897.
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property license sunk costs.50 Upon rejection, the licensees claim for
damages would be unsecured,51 non-priority52 and dischargeable.53 After
Lubrizol, a licensor could use Section 365 and “reclaim intellectual property
licenses in an effort to negotiate better terms.”54 To safeguard their interests,
licensees demanded security interests in the licensed intellectual property
and insisted that the license agreements be structured as completed sales.55
Owing to the market instability created as a result of the Lubrizol
decision,56 in August 1987, a bill designed to clarify the “right of the parties
when a licensor or licensee declares bankruptcy”57 was introduced before
the American Congress.58 Signed into law on October 18, 1988, the
Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act (IPBPA) introduced Section
365(n) to the American Bankruptcy Law.59 Section 365(n) served as a veto
power in favor of the licensees, who now had the option to determine the
effect of the licensor’s rejection on an intellectual property license.60 Upon
rejection, a licensee can treat such a contract as terminated and rely on
Section 365(g) to seek a remedy.61 Alternatively, the rights under the
licensing agreement could be retained by the licensee.62 With the
introduction of Section 365(n), the Lubrizol decision was impeached of its
precedential authority.63

50. Laura B. Bartell, Straddle Obligations Under Prepetition Contracts: Prepetition Claims,
Postpetition Claims or Administrative Expenses?, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 39, 48–49 (2008).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1), defining secured claims to include only those secured by a lien on the
debtor’s property; James, supra note 41, at 897-98.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 507, prioritizing payment of certain types of claims; Id. at 897-98.
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1): The confirmation plan discharges the debtor from…any debt of a
kind specified in Section 502(g); Id. at 897-98.
54. Alexander N Kreisman, Calling All Supreme Court Justices! It Might Be Time to Settle This
“Rejection” Business Once and For All: A Look at Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American
Manufacturing and the Resulting Circuit Split, 8 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 30, 44-46 (2012).
55. Michael J. Shpizner, Congress passes new legislation protecting licensees of intellectual
property, 4 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REVIEW 27–28, 27–28 (1989).
56. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, supra note 24. The Lubrizol ruling occurred
because Congress never considered this issue, because no courts had considered it before the Bankruptcy
Reform of 1978 and because it requires the application in bankruptcy cases of the very specialized area
of intellectual property law. Daniel A. Nolan, A “Fundamental” Problem: The Vulnerability of
Intellectual Property Licenses in Chapter 15 and the Meaning of § 1506, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 177,
184–86 (2011).
57. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, supra note 24.
58. Id. For a detailed legislative history of the bill see: Mary A Moy, The Intellectual Property
Bankruptcy Protection Act: An Unbalanced Solution to the International Software Licensing Dilemma,
11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 151, 178–183 (1989).
59. John Fry, The Rejection of Executory Contracts under the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Protection Act of 1988, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621, 640 (1989)
60. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(n)(1)-(2); Moskowitz, supra note 27, at 786.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(a); For a detailed assessment of Section 365(n), see Nolan, supra note 56,
at 185-86.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(b).
63. Aditya Gupta & Hiral Mehta Kumar, In Re Tempnology: Revisiting trade mark licensing in
bankruptcy in the USA and India, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 749, 749–60 (2020).
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B. IN RE QIMONDA AND IP LICENSES
The introduction of Section 365(n) through IPBPA, 1988 is significant
to the string of judicial decisions in the Qimonda liquidation dispute. The
bankruptcy court’s decision identified Section 365(n) and the congressional
intentions supporting its promulgation as the fundamental public policy of
the United States.64 The decision from the Court of Appeals also weaved the
underlying concerns of IPBPA, 1988 within its decision.65
After Qimonda filed for insolvency in Germany, the German trustee, Dr
Jaffe, approached an American Bankruptcy Court. The requests made by Dr.
Jaffe were within the remit of Chapter 15 of the American Bankruptcy Code.
Enacted in 2005, titled Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,66 Chapter
15 incorporates the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency in the American
Bankruptcy Code.67 It provides “a clear procedural framework for Courts
dealing with bankruptcy of a multinational company, and it was intended to
work with the fundamental United States policy and existing case law.”68
Chapter 15 makes very narrow and limited deviations from the Model Law.69
Section 1515 of the Code allows a foreign representative to file a petition for
recognition before an American bankruptcy court. Section 1521(a) allows
the foreign representative to request additional relief from a foreign court.70
Apart from an application for recognition, citing his entitlements under
Section 1521(a)(5), Dr. Jaffe also requested the administration of Qimonda’s
American assets.
The bankruptcy court recognized the German proceedings as the
foreign main proceedings.71 However, Qimonda’s licensees approached the
bankruptcy court challenging the administration of American patents by the
German bankruptcy proceedings. After an evidentiary hearing, the court
entered a supplemental order, where the German trustee was required to
ensure that the protections available in Section 365(n) of the American
Bankruptcy Code are made available to the American licensees.72 On appeal,
the supplemental order was amended. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of
a central administration of the worldwide patent portfolio and opined that the
protections of IP licenses would be a subject of litigation before the German

64. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 470 B.R. 374, 382 (E.D. Va. 2012).
65. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 23 (4th. Cir. 2013).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1501-1532; For details, see Ethan Meredith, Bilateral Insolvency Agreements: A
Two-Sided Solution for Reciprocity in Cross-Border Insolvency, 8 GEORGE MASON J. INT’L COM.L L.
286, 379, 385 (2017).
67. See Peter Gilhuly et al,, Bankruptcy Without Borders: A Comprehensive Guide to the First
Decade of Chapter 15, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 54–60 (2016).
68. Nolan, supra note 56, at 177.
69. In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2010).
70. R. CRAIG MARTIN & CULLEN DRESCHER SPECKHART, CHAPTER 15 FOR FOREIGN DEBTORS 37,
38, 72–77 (2015).
71. In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM (Chapter 15), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4410 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. July 22, 2009).
72. Id.
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insolvency proceeding.73 Such amendment of the order meant that if the
German law allowed Dr Jaffe to reject IP licenses, he could sidestep the
protections legislated by the IPBPA, 1988.
On appeal to the District Court, the decision of the bankruptcy court
was reversed and remanded. 74 The bankruptcy court was called upon to
consider the interests of the licensees of American patents and determine if
the violation of the relief granted in Section 365(n) would violate
fundamental public policy.75 On remand, the bankruptcy court, and
subsequently the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, held that the
protections legislated by the IPBPA, 1988 should be made available to the
American licensees.76 Dr. Jaffe even approached the United States Supreme
Court to challenge the decision of the Fourth Circuit court. However, the
Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari.77
The significant findings from the judicial decisions are discussed
hereinbelow:
i. Balancing the antithetical interests of creditors and debtors:
Section 1521 of the American Bankruptcy Code catalogs the reliefs
available to a foreign representative after the recognition of a foreign
proceeding. Section 1521 closely tracks the language of Article 21 of the
Model Law. The provision entitles a court to entrust the debtor’s assets to a
foreign representative.78 The discretion of the court under Section 1521 is
subjected to Section 1522, which mandates that a discretionary relief can be
granted only if “the interests of the creditors and other interested parties,
including the debtor, are sufficiently protected.”79
When Qimonda’s licensees approached the bankruptcy court, citing the
potential loss of their interests, the bankruptcy court opined that Section
1522(a) requires that the licensees be sufficiently protected even if it
adversely affects the bankrupt debtor. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
confirmed the interpretation of the bankruptcy court.80 The Circuit Judge,
Justice Niemeyer, held that before granting any relief under section 1521,
the court must ensure compliance with the protections offered by section
1522. Section 1522 empowers the bankruptcy court to subject any relief
granted under section 1521 “to conditions it considers appropriate.” Section
1522 requires a court to consider the interests of both creditors and debtors.
73. In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 178-79, 181-82 (2011); See Andrew B. Dawson, Modularity
in Cross-Border Insolvency Comparative and Cross-Border Issues in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law,
93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 677, 708–09 (2018).
74. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 470 B.R. 376, 380 (E.D. Va. 2012).
75. Id. at 376, 381-82; Dawson, supra note 73, at 708-09.
76. In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 167, 186 (2011); Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 29, 32
(4th. Cir. 2013).
77. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 574 U.S. 921 (2014).
78. MARTIN & SPECKHART, supra note 70, at 72–74.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b).
80. Jaffe, 737 F.3d at 32.
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Since the interests of the debtors and creditors can potentially be
antagonistic, Section 1522 inherently calls for a balancing test. Support for
this position was also found in the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law
and judicial precedent dealing with Article 22 of the Model Law and Section
1522 of the American Bankruptcy Code.81
ii. Public Policy Limitation:
Section 1506, along with Sections 1521 and 1522 of the American
Bankruptcy Court, serves as safety valves, allowing American Courts to
protect the interests of the American creditors in a Chapter 15 insolvency
proceeding.82 Section 1506 is an embodiment of Article 6 of the Model Law.
It allows a bankruptcy court to “refuse to take any action under Chapter 15
if such action would be manifestly contrary to the United States Public
Policy.”83 However, the public policy exception should be invoked only in
“exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance
for the United States.”84
On remand, the bankruptcy court in In Re Qimonda cited the public
policy exception to subject the relief sought by Dr. Jaffe to the protections
offered by Section 365(n) of the American Bankruptcy Code.85 The
bankruptcy court argued that the failure to apply section 365(n) would
undermine the fundamental US public policy of promoting technological
innovation. Hence, the safety valve available under section 1506 was
activated.
The bankruptcy court studied the existing judicial precedents on the
subject86 and extrapolated three principles that guide the application of
section 1506: “1) mere conflict between the US law and the foreign law is
not sufficient to trigger the public policy exemption; 2) deference should not
be afforded to a foreign proceeding if its procedural fairness is in doubt and
cannot be cured; and (3) an action should not be taken in a chapter 15
proceeding if where it would frustrate a US court’s ability to administer the
chapter 15 case or would severely impinge on a US constitutional right.”87
The bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the public policy limitation
received considerable criticism. Elizabeth Blunkel argued that the court in
Qimonda failed to articulate how Section 365(n) constitutes fundamental
public policy of the United States. She asserts that there may be multiple
81. Sandeep Gopalan & Michael Guihot, Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border Insolvency
Law: A Proposal for Judicial Gap-Filling, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1225, 1256–57 (2015).
82. Michael Garza, When is Cross-Border Insolvency Recognition Manifestly Contrary to Public
Policy, 38 FORDHAM INT’l L. J., 1587, 1623–1627 (2015); For relevance and importance of the public
policy exemption see: John J Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step toward Erosion
of National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 89, 133–34 (2006).
83. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, at P 1506.01.
84. NEIL FRANCIS HANNAN, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 80–83 (Springer Nature ed. 2017).
85. In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 167, 185 (2011).
86. Id. at 179.
87. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, at P 1506.01.
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patent registrations, in different countries, over a single process or invention.
Suppose each of these countries argues that their domestic policy best
reflects their policy of technological innovation. In that case, it will lead to
an inconsistent interpretation of the Model Law, which can, in turn, frustrate
the “general aims of comity” expressed in the Model Law. Such an
interpretation would suggest that the bankruptcy court conflated
“fundamental notions of public policy with statutory manifestations of
current US policy.”88 Dr Hannan went as far as to suggest that the bankruptcy
court’s decision “is not a true interpretation” of the public policy exception.
He argues that the bankruptcy court’s decision is influenced by American
economic concerns and the “more political nature of the judges in the
USA.”89 Alternatively, before the bankruptcy court gave its opinion, some
scholars argued that the bankruptcy courts should interpret the public policy
limitation to protect intellectual property licensees. The primary argument
such scholars align with is that promoting intellectual property growth
should certainly qualify as fundamental public policy of the United States.90
Both of these interpretations have merit. However, the judicial
precedent and its international resonance seem to tilt in favor of the latter
interpretation. For the authors in the present study to side with any of the
interpretations, it would require a detailed analysis of what constitutes
fundamental US public policy? Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the
present study.

III. INDIAN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY REGIME
A. EXISTING REGIME
IBC 2016, as it stands today, does not substantively deal with issues
relating to cross-border insolvencies.91 The Bankruptcy Law Reforms
Committee (BLRC) noted that their recommendations are limited to
insolvency and bankruptcy in so far as it is a “purely domestic issue.”92
However, the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which reviewed a draft
of the IBC, believed that the implication of Cross-Border insolvency could
not be ignored for a very long time. Referring to provisions regulating crossborder insolvency, JPC noted that “not incorporating this will lead to an
incomplete code.”93 However, instead of incorporating comprehensive

88. Elizabeth Buckel, Curbing Comity: The Increasingly Expansive Public Policy Exception of
Chapter 15, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1282, 1304-06 (2013).
89. HANNAN, supra note 84, at 83.
90. Nolan, supra note 56, at 224.
91. MITTAL, supra note 21, at 1266; SUMANT BATRA, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY: LAW AND
PRACTICE 571, 572, 586–90 (First ed. 2017) (India).
92. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS COMMITTEE, supra note 7 at 10–18.
93. Joint Committee on Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2015, Report on the Joint Committee on
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 44 (Issued on April, 2016) (India); The Committee also amended
the definition of the term ‘property’ to include property which is situated outside India.
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statutory guidelines on the subject, only two provisions were included,
dealing with cross border insolvency issues in a cursory manner.94
Section 234 of IBC, 2016 enables the Government of India to enter into
reciprocity agreements with other countries.95 Section 235 applies when the
assets of the corporate debtor are situated in a foreign jurisdiction.96 In such
a case, the insolvency professional can submit an application to the NCLT
stating that evidence or action in reference to assets is required in connection
with a proceeding within IBC, 2016.97 However, to make such a request, the
foreign country and India should have entered into a reciprocal arrangement
in terms of Section 234.98 On being satisfied with the insolvency
professional’s request, the NCLT may issue a letter of request to a competent
court in the foreign jurisdiction.99
IBC, 2016 heavily relies on the Indian government to enter into bilateral
agreements. While the two provisions acknowledge the issues arising out of
cross-border insolvency, they “postpone consideration of substantive
provisions on cross-border insolvency to bilateral agreements.”100 Such
reliance on bilateral arrangements is misplaced as there are multiple
challenges in creating such agreements.101 Firstly, negotiating such bilateral
agreements may require intense negotiations, which can be timeconsuming.102 Secondly, each country may require different sets of
provisions, potentially resulting in further fragmentation of the Indian crossborder insolvency regime.103 Since the adoption of the Code in 2016, the
Government of India has not entered into any bilateral agreements within
Section 234.104 This in itself is a testament to the inherent issues with the
existing mechanism.
Regardless of the inherent problems with the existing mechanism, the
incidence of cross-border insolvency issues has been steadily increasing in
India. In fact, Prof. Moustaira traces the first cross-border insolvency
protocol to have entered into in case of cross-border insolvency between

94. Ran Chakrabarti, Key Issues in Cross-Border Insolvency, 30 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA Rev. 119,
119–135 (2018).
95. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 234 (India); ASHISH MAKHIJA, INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY CODE OF INDIA: A COMMENTARY ON INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION, LIQUIDATION,
BANKRUPTCY OF CORPORATE PERSONS, INDIVIDUALS, SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP & PARTNERSHIP FIRMS
1512–14 (First ed. 2019).
96. For a detailed discussion about Section 235 see BATRA, supra note 91, at 585–86.
97. See MAKHIJA, supra note 95, at 1515.
98. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 235(1) (India); Id. at 1515-16.
99. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 235(2) (India).
100. BATRA, supra note 91, at 581.
101. See Chakrabarti, supra note 94, at 126.
102. BATRA, supra note 91, at 583–84.
103. Ishita Das, The Need for Implementing a Cross-Border Insolvency Regime within the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, 45 VIKALPA 104, 110 (2020). See Vakil N. Bahram, Suharsh Sinha & Amrita
Sinha, Insolvency and Bankr. Bd. of India, Legislating for Cross Border Insolvency in India, in
QUINQUENNIAL OF INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE, 2016, at 453, 455 (2021).
104. Das, supra note 103; BAHRAM ET AL., supra note 103.
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India and England.105 Dating back to 1908, the case involved an involuntary
liquidation proceeding of an Anglo-Indian merchant and a banking
partnership.106 The two jurisdictions involved were India and England. In
order to ensure the best results, the administrators from the two jurisdictions
agreed that “if there were surplus sums, they would be remitted to the other
proceeding, so that all creditors could be satisfied.”107 Despite such lineage,
the Indian insolvency regime lags far behind other jurisdictions as far as
cross border insolvency issues are concerned.108
In 2019, the State Bank of India filed an application before the NCLT
Chandigarh for initiating insolvency proceedings against SEL
Manufacturing Company Ltd.109 After the insolvency proceedings were
initiated, the Indian insolvency practitioner approached the US bankruptcy
court for the District of Delaware for recognition of Indian insolvency
proceedings.110 The US court recognized the Indian proceedings as the
foreign main proceedings within the meaning of Section 1502(4) of the
American Bankruptcy Court.111 This was the first instance where a foreign
court recognized Indian insolvency proceedings.112
A similar issue arose during the Jet Airways insolvency dispute, which
highlighted how ill-equipped IBC, 2016 is to deal with cross-border
insolvency issues. After the NCLT declared that the Dutch proceedings are
a nullity in the eyes of law,113 the NCLAT directed the administrators to
explore the possibility of cooperation between the two proceedings.114 The
administrators from the two jurisdictions came up with the terms and
conditions of their cooperation, and labelled it as “Cross-Border Insolvency
Protocol.”115 By an order dated September 26, 2019, the NCLAT mandated
105. MOUSTAIRA, supra note 28, at 109-10. However, it should be noted that at the time when the
case was decided, India was a colony of England and the insolvency laws in the two countries were largely
identical).
106. In re P. Macfadyen & Co. v. Vizianaaram Co., Ltd., 1 K.B. 675 (1908) as cited in UNCITRAL
PRACTICE GUIDE ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY COOPERATION, 125, 126 (Vereinte Nationen ed., 2010).
107. MOUSTAIRA, supra note 28 at 109.
108. MOUSTAIRA, supra note 28, at 109; MANNAN, supra note 17.
109. Order, State Bank of India v. SEL Manufacturing Company Ltd. 2018 SCC OnLine NCLT
22455 (India).
110. Petition, In re SEL Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (2019) (No. 1:19-bk-10988); See Umakanth Varottil,
Indian Insolvency Proceeding Secures First Recognition under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code,
INDIACORPLAW (Dec. 20, 2019), https://indiacorplaw.in/2019/12/indian-insolvency-proceedingsecures-first-recognition-chapter-15-us-bankruptcy-code.html.
111. Written Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant para. 3(j), Vikram Bajaj v. Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers & Ors., CB 409/PB/2017, NCLT, New Delhi (India).
112. Manisha Arora & Raushan Kumar, India’s tryst with cross-border insolvency law: How series
of
judicial
pronouncements
pave
the
way?,
SCC
BLOG
(Apr.
16,
2021),
https://www.scconline.com/blog/?p=247207.
113. State Bank of India v. Jet Airways (India) Ltd., CP 2205/MB/2019, NCLT, Mumbai (India).
114. Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India & Anr., 2019 SCC Online NCLAT 385 (2019)
(India).
115. Protocols are generally written agreements dealing with actual and/or potential matters of
conflict. In practice, Protocols are entered into at the behest of parties or insolvency representatives in
consultation with the courts involved in a cross-border proceeding. Once approved formally by courts,
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compliance with the protocol, and held that it should be treated as a
“direction of this Appellate Tribunal.”116 Largely modelled on the
UNCITRAL Model Law, the protocol defined the terms of cooperation
between the two insolvency courts. Given that Jet Airways was an Indian
company, the protocol recognized India as the centre of main interest.117 The
decision of the NCLAT to recognize and enforce the insolvency proceedings
according to the Cross-Border insolvency protocol was appreciated by some
practitioners and academicians.118 However, the adoption of the Protocol and
its eventual recognition should not be treated as a potential solution for any
cross-border insolvency issues that may arise in the future.119
The Standing Committee on Finance, on March 4 2020, noted that past
disputes involving issues related to cross-border insolvency have resulted in
“uncertain recoveries for creditors.” The Committee noted that a bill
regulating such issues should be introduced as soon as possible.120
Depending on judicial precedents without the guidance of statutory
instruction is “likely to inspire less confidence in global investors seeking to
work with India Inc.”121 A statutorily directed cross border insolvency
framework can “reduce a great deal of uncertainty, unnecessary work and
process, and potential points of tension.”122
Protocols, such as the one entered into during the Jet Airways dispute,
can be relied on to accommodate the possible conflicting objectives of
different insolvency regimes. The CBIRC suggested that the NCLT should
acknowledge the possible inconsistencies in the substantial insolvency laws
of each jurisdiction and “build provisions in the protocol to achieve the
maximum possible cohesion in the steps taken by the foreign representative
and the IP (Insolvency Professional) in dealing with the insolvency of the
corporate debtor.”123
B. ILC REPORT/ PROPOSED REGIME
Apart from the recent judicial controversy, the requirement of updating
the cross-border insolvency framework of the Indian insolvency regime has
such Protocols, entered into and agreed upon between the parties establish a broad framework of
principles to govern multiple insolvency proceedings; See, Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations
Committee, supra note 14, at 59.
116. Jet Airways (India) Ltd. v. State Bank of India & Anr., 2019 SCC Online NCLAT 385 (2019)
(India).
117. Priya Misra & Adam Feibelman, The Institutional Challenges of a Cross-Border Insolvency
Regime, 2 CORP. & BUS. L.J. 329, 337–40 (2021).
118. SEE, E.G., Bahram et al., supra note 103, at 454.
119. See Gabriela Roca Fernandez, Cross-Border Insolvency in India: A Resistance to Change, 29
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 111–14 (2021); see Misra, supra note 11, at 99; see BATRA, supra note 91,
at 571.
120. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Second Amendment) Bill, Standing Committee on Finance,
2019, § 2.6 (2020).
121. Bahram et al., supra note 103, at 454.
122. Misra & Feibelman, supra note 117, at 338.
123. Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 14, para. 4.7.3, at 60-62.
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been highlighted by multiple administrative committees. The Eradi
Committee Report of 2000 suggested the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model
Law, noting that the adoption of the Model Law will “facilitate international
trade.”124 This opinion was reiterated in 2002 by the NL Mitra Committee.125
However, when the BLRC was preparing a draft of the IBC, issues related
to cross-border insolvency were identified as the “next frontier.”126 It was
only in October 2018 that substantive provisions related to cross-border
insolvency regulation were suggested.127
The Insolvency Law Committee was appointed in 2017 to “take stock
of the functioning and implementation of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 and identify the issues that affect the efficacy of the corporate
insolvency resolution and liquidation framework.”128 In March 2018, ILC
noted that the IBC, 2016 in its current form does not “provide an overarching
framework for insolvency involving assets, creditors or parallel proceedings
in foreign jurisdictions.”129 Underlining the global recognition and
acceptance of the Model Law, ILC prepared its draft regulations based on
the Model Law template. The regulations, labelled by the Committee as
‘Draft Part Z,’ are essentially an amended version of the Model Law.130
Some important elements of the ILC draft regulations suggested by ILC are
discussed below.
i. Scope
ILC noted that since the applicability of the Code does not extend to
personal insolvencies and is limited to corporate debtors, the applicability of
the cross-border insolvency provisions should also be limited to corporate
debtors.131 The CBIRC in their report identified that two sets of businesses,
financial service providers and companies providing critical infrastructure or
utility services, should be exempted from the applicability of cross-border
insolvency regulations.132
The ILC identified that the definition of ‘corporate debtor’ requires an
amendment to ensure that the companies outside India can approach the
NCLT for cooperation and recognition of foreign proceedings. The
suggested amendment includes foreign companies within the definition of a

124. MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE AND COMPANY AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE
LAW RELATING TO INSOLVENCY AND WINDING UP OF COMPANIES PARA. 6.19 (2000) (emphasis
added).
125. COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK FRAUDS, THE REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE
ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK FRAUDS, AT 36-44 (2001).
126. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 2.
127. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 83.
130. See id.; For details on the amendments see Misra & Feibelman, supra note 117, at 339-40.
131. For definition of Corporate Debtor, see Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, India
Code (2016), § 3(7)-(8); for further discussion, see MITTAL, supra note 21, at 96–106.
132. Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 14, para. 4.1.1.
ON
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corporate debtor.133 The CBIRC studied the viability of this amendment in
further detail. It suggested that the Central Government should commission
a study to investigate the amendments required to the IBC, 2016, and the
Companies Act, 2013, to ensure that then provisions of the OBC can be made
available to foreign companies.134
Further, ILC adopted the reciprocity requirement in the cross-border
insolvency regulations.135 Clause 1(4) of the proposed regulations provides
that the cross-border insolvency provisions would apply only to countries
that have either adopted the Model Law or if the Central Government extends
the application of the Model Law to any other country. The requirement of
reciprocity is absent in the American Bankruptcy Code136, the English
insolvency regime137 and other insolvency statutes from New Zealand,
China, Japan, Serbia, Montenegro and Poland.138 Countries such as
Mexico139 and South Africa140 have adopted reciprocity requirement.
Without dealing with the substantive reasons for incorporating the
reciprocity requirement, ILC noted that the requirement could be diluted
with the growing experience of implementing the Model Law.141
The inclusion of the reciprocity requirement can be potentially
controversial.142 After conducting a thorough investigation of the national
statutes incorporating the reciprocity requirement, Prof. Yamauchi noted that
the reciprocity requirement “leaves us with that same lack of predictability
and potential and fairness that the Model Law was seeking to alleviate.”143
Countries can cite the reciprocity requirement to deny recognition to
proceedings and judgements and result in stalemates and retaliatory
actions.144 This observation has important lessons for India.
ii. Recognition of Foreign Proceedings
Provisions dealing with recognition of foreign proceedings are a vital
part of the Model Law.145 Chapter III of the Model Law enables a foreign
133. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 1.1-.3.
134. Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 14, para. 4.1.1.
135. Neeti Shikha, Insolvency and Bankr. Bd. of India, India’s Tryst with Cross Border Insolvency,
in INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE 323, 325-26 (2020).
136. HARV. L. ASS’N, Developments in the Law–Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1293
(2011); see Keith D. Yamauchi, Should Reciprocity Be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-Border
Insolvency Law?, 16 INT. INSOLV. REV. 145, 145-179 (2007).
137. Yamauchi, supra note 137, at 172–73.
138. Id. at 170–72.
139. Código de Comercio [CCom], art. 280, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 12-05-2000,
(Mex.).; see Yamauchi, supra note 137, at 167-68.
140. Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 §2(2)(a) (S. Afr.); see Yamauchi, supra note 137, at
168-70.
141. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 1.6-1.8.
142. Shikha, supra note 5, at 3.
143. Yamauchi, supra note 137, at 179.
144. Id.
145. See NEIL HANNAN, How Does the Model Law Affect Existing Principles of Recognition?, in
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 23-41 (2017).
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representative to apply for recognition of foreign proceedings,146 the manner
of recognition,147 and the effect of recognition of foreign proceedings.148
Clause 12(1) of the proposed ILC draft regulations traces the language of
Article 15 of the Model Law and empowers a foreign representative to apply
to the NCLT for the recognition of foreign proceedings.149
The Model Law lays down an objective criterion for the recognition of
foreign proceedings.150 Article 17 of the Model Law provides jurisdictional
pre-conditions, upon fulfilment of which, a court must recognize the foreign
proceedings.151 The reliance on pre-conditions reduces the discretion
available to a bankruptcy court.152 Similar provisions have been included in
the Model Law. Clause 15(1) of the ILC draft regulations provides that as
long as the foreign proceeding complies with the definition of the term
“proceeding”, the foreign representative is a person or body and the
application meets the requirements set out in Clause 12, NCLT shall
recognize the foreign proceeding.153 The ILC was cognizant of that the
NCLT does not have any discretion in recognizing the foreign proceedings,
and therefore suggested that the NCLT be provided with an additional 30
days to decide an application for recognition.154
iii. Centre of Main Interests (COMI)
ILC draft regulations allow NCLT to recognize foreign proceedings as
either foreign main proceeding, or as foreign non-main proceedings.155 While
making this distinction, the concept of Centre of Main Interests (COMI)
assumes importance,156 and becomes fundamental to the operation of the
Model Law.157 The Model Law identifies a foreign main proceeding as the
location where the debtor’s centre of main interests lies.158 An inconsistent
146. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY,
art. 15, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997).
147. Id. art. 16-17.
148. Id. art. 20.
149. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, § 12, at 56-57.
150. Id. para. 12.2.
151. The jurisdictional pre-conditions are: 1] the foreign proceeding complies with the definition of
foreign proceeding set out in Article 2(a); 2] the application meets the requirements set out in Article
15(2), and 3] the application has been submitted before the appropriate court; U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L
TRADE L., GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY para. 150–53, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2014).
152. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 12.2; See In re Gold & Honey, 410 BR 357
(Bankr. EDNY 2009) (showing an instance where foreign proceedings have not been recognised);
Christopher Mallon et al., Cross-Border Issues, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RESTRUCTURING IN THE
UK AND US 431, 461-63 (Christopher Mallon, Shai Y. Waisman, & Ray C. Schrock eds., 2nd ed. 2017).
153. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, § 15, at 58.
154. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, § 15(4), at 58.
155. Id. at 58.
156. See Mallon et al., supra note 152, at 465-66.
157. T.K. Viswanathan, Insolvency and Bankr. Bd. of India, Cross-Border Insolvency: Challenges
and Opportunities, in INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE: A MISCELLANY OF PERSPECTIVES 239,
245-46 (2019); Scott Atkins & Kai Luck, Re Hydrodec Group, 30 INT. INSOLV. REV. 460, 462-64 (2021).
158. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 146, art. 17(2).
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application of the Model Law’s principles on identifying COMI can result in
inconsistent recognition of foreign main proceedings. If different
jurisdictions subscribe to different tests in identifying COMI, the
entitlements associated with the recognition of foreign main proceedings will
not be consistently distributed.159 Thus, leading to forum shopping and
jurisdictional conflicts with each different court recognizing a different
proceeding as the COMI.160
The jurisdiction where the debtor’s main interests lie is recognized as
the foreign main proceeding.161 Following Article 16(3) of the Model Law,
Clause 14 of the ILC draft regulations provides a rebuttable presumption that
the COMI of the debtor will be where the registered office of the corporate
debtor lies.162
ILC admitted that this provision could be surreptitiously used, resulting
in forum shopping by the corporate debtor. The Model Law places the onus
on domestic courts to identify the abuse of process by the corporate debtor.163
To provide some safeguards against the abuse of process, ILC relied on the
EU regulations and included a 3-month look-back period in Clause 14.164 If
the corporate debtor has moved its registered office to another country within
three months before initiating insolvency proceedings, the presumption will
cease to assume effect.165 In such a case, ILC recommended that the place of
central administration, that is readily ascertainable by the creditors should
be recognized as the COMI.166 In case the place of central administration is
not ascertainable, ILC suggested that the list of indicative factors such as the
location of financing and the location of the debtor’s book and records should
be consulted.167 The CBIRC suggested an alteration to such a hierarchical
manner of identifying the COMI. It identified a list of indicative factors and
suggested that the identification of the place of central administration cannot
be dissociated with the adjudication of such additional factors. Therefore, the
CBIRC argued in favor of identifying the place of central administration by
reference to the additional indicative factors.168

159. See Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 14, at 51.
160. Meredith, supra note 66, at 391-93.
161. Atkins & Luck, supra note 157, at 462.
162. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 11.3.
163. Id. at cl. 11.3; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 151, para. 148; see Atkins & Luck, supra note 157, at 16162, 165.
164. Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on
Insolvency Proceedings, art. 3(1), 2015 O.J. (L 141), 19, 19-72.
165. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, § 14(2), at 57-58.
166. GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 151, at 70-71.
167. Shikha, supra note 135, at 330; Viswanathan, supra note 157, at 246; for more relevant factors
see HANNAN, supra note 84, at 43–53.
168. Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 14, para. 4.6.
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iv. Reliefs for a foreign proceeding
Once an application for recognition is filed, Article 19 of the Model
Law allows a foreign representative to apply for interim relief even before
the foreign proceedings are recognized. Discretionary upon the court’s
decision, interim relief includes staying the execution of debtor’s assets,
entrusting the administration or realization of debtor’s assets who either by
their nature or otherwise are perishable, susceptible to devaluation or
otherwise in jeopardy. 169 Unless extended by the court, interim relief
terminates on the recognition of the foreign proceeding.170
Citing the example of IBC, 2016, which does not provide interim relief
during CIRP, ILC recommended that there is precedent for the misuse of the
power to apply for interim relief. Therefore, ILC recommended that a
discretionary interim relief should not be included in the regulations.171
Article 20 of the Model Law provides that, upon recognition, an
automatic moratorium shall be appliable. ILC adopted this provision and
recommended that a moratorium similar to the one imposed by Section 14
of the IBC, 2016 be applicable upon recognizing foreign proceedings.172
While the Model law allows the courts to modify or terminate the scope of
this moratorium,173 ILC omitted this provision from their set of
recommendations.174
Apart from the mandatory relief, the Model Law also empowers the
courts to provide discretionary relief regarding foreign main and non-main
proceedings. Article 21 of the Model Law provides an inclusive list of reliefs
that a foreign representative can request.175 Modelled on Article 21, ILC
recommended the adoption of Clause 18, which empowers the foreign
representative to apply to the NCLT for discretionary relief.176 However, the
ILC noted that this power should be used sparingly and only in cases “where
the need for such relief is clearly established and the interest of domestic
creditors are protected.”177
The manner in which discretionary relief should be administered was a
point of contention in Qimonda dispute.178 The recommendations of ILC
regarding Article 21 of the Model Law provisions assume particular
importance to the present study as sections 1521 and 1522 of Chapter 15 of
169. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 146, art. 19(1).
170. Id. art. 19(3).
171. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 13.1-.4, at 35-36.
172. Id. para. 14.2-.3., at 36-37; see id. § 17, at 59-60.
173. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 146, art. 20(2), at 10.
174. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 14.4, at 37.
175. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 151, para. 189-95, at
87-89.
176. The CBIRC provided an indicative list of discretionary reliefs that can be provided within Clause
18. See Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee, supra note 16, at 57-58.
177. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, § 18(1), at 60, para. 14.8-.13, at 38.
178. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co. (In re Qimonda AG), 470 B.R. 374, 380 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012);
Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 14, 32 (4th Cir. 2013).
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the American Bankruptcy Code are American iterations of Article 21 and 22
of the Model Law.179
ILC’s recommendation that discretionary relief should be used
sparingly is in consonance with the international jurisprudence of Article
21.180 However, the Committee did not make a reference to the balancing
test, used in the Qimonda case, which is an integral part of the application of
Article 21.181
v. Public Policy exception
Article 6 of the Model Law creates a safeguard in favor of the enacting
state. Citing Article 6, a company can deny any action which has been
requested by a foreign insolvency administrator. However, in order to deny
any relief, Article 6 requires the court to establish that the proposed action is
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the enacting state.
In making this exception, UNCITRAL did not define the term public
policy. The Guide to Enactment acknowledges that the interpretation of
public policy would vary from state to state, and therefore it should not be
defined by the Model Law.182 Pointing towards the use of the term manifestly,
the Guide to Enactment highlights that the provision should be interpreted
restrictively and should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances.183
Given the importance of this provision and its intersection with the
remaining provisions in a cross-border insolvency regime, different
countries have incorporated different versions of Article 6 in their domestic
legislation. Some nations such as Australia, UK and USA have retained the
term manifestly, whereas Canada, Mexico and Greece have omitted it.184 In
order to limit the applicability of the exception, Japan and Poland have
replaced the term public policy with public peace or public order.185
ILC recommended a verbatim adoption of Article 6. Citing examples
from US judicial decisions, the Committee noted that the public policy
exception should be exercised narrowly and used sparingly.186 The ILC draft
regulations allow the NCLT to invite submissions from the Central
Government if it believes that a proposed action can be manifestly contrary
to the public policy. If the NCLT does not issue a notice, the proposed
regulations empower the Central Government to approach the NCLT suo
moto if it believes that a proposed action is in violation to the state’s public

179. See Mallon et al., supra note 152, at 464.
180. Id. at para. 14.37-14.39; cf. MARTIN AND SPECKHART, supra note 70, at 72–76 (demonstrating
an international example of discretionary relief).
181. See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 151, para. 196-99.
182. Id. para. 101.
183. Id. para. 104; Garza, supra note 82, at 1595-97.
184. Garza, supra note 82, at 1594-98.
185. Id. at 1587; Shikha, supra note 5, at 166.
186. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 3.4.

Summer 2022

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES

203

policy.187 It has been pointed out that the Central Government may use its
power to issue suo moto notices based on “populist perception or in regard
to domestic considerations.”188
While discussing the possible interpretation of the public policy
principle, ILC cited the experience from international jurisprudence,189
specifically, Samsung v. Jaffe. 190 ILC cited the decisions of the bankruptcy
court191 and the Court of Appeals192 in Samsung v. Jaffe, as valid applications
of the public policy exception.193 It was explicitly noted that the three
principles developed by the bankruptcy court in In re Qimonda, largely guide
the analysis of the public policy exception.194 Since the Indian insolvency
regime does not legislate explicit protections for intellectual property
licensees, ILC’s reliance on the judicial decisions in the Qimonda dispute is
interesting.
The next section highlights the lack of international guidance on the
subject of IP licensing in bankruptcy. It also examines the Indian insolvency
regime to determine the possible treatment offered to intellectual property
assets during an Indian licensor’s bankruptcy.

VI. LACK OF A CLEAR MANDATE ON IP LICENSING DURING
BANKRUPTCY

Unlike American law on the subject, Indian law does not legislate
explicit protections for intellectual property licensees.195 Further, unlike
American judicial decisions, such as Lubrizol,196 In re Exide197 and
Tempnology,198 the Indian judiciary has not yet had an opportunity to decide
on an issue of IP licensing in bankruptcy. Hence, there is a lack of judicial
and legislative guidance about the treatment of IP licenses within the Indian
insolvency regime.199

187. Id. § 3.7.; Shikha, supra note 135, at 330-31; Mamata Biswal, Insolvency and Bankr. Bd. of
India, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency in the Indian Legal Landscape, in
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY REGIME IN INDIA: A NARRATIVE, 340–42 (2020).
188. Shikha, supra note 5, at 166.
189. Insolvency Law Committee, supra note 13, para. 3.6.
190. In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66926 *1, *42-63 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2010).
191. In re Qimonda AG, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4191 *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
192. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24041 *1 (4th Cir. 2013).
193. Biswal et al., supra note 187, at 341-42.
194. See Gilhuly et al., supra note 67, at 70-71.
195. See M.P. Ram Mohan & Aditya Gupta, Treatment of Intellectual Property License in Insolvency:
Analysing Indian law in comparison with the U.S. and U.K. 1, 17-22, 24 (Indian Inst. Of Mgmt.
Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 2021-08-01), https://web.iima.ac.in/faculty-and-research/research-andpublication/working-papers.html&rnp_id=14663.
196. Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
197. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010).
198. Mission Prod. Holdings v. Tempnology, LLC., 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
199. Mohan & Gupta, supra note 195.
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Partial blame for the lack of any guidance can be accrued to the fact that
the Indian Insolvency regime does not incorporate a power as broad and as
far-reaching as the power of rejection incorporated in section 365 of the
American Bankruptcy Code.200 Furthermore, the international projects
governing contractual relationships have failed to provide any guidance on
the appropriate treatment of IP licenses. This essentially creates a vacuum in
international guidance on the recognition and enforcement of IP contract
archetypes.201

A. LACK OF AN INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION ABOUT IP LICENSING IN
BANKRUPTCY

The growing ubiquity of IP transactions in contemporary global and
domestic business transactions has consistently supplanted business
enterprises that primarily depend on the sale of goods.202 The growth in the
number of IP registrations is a primary indicator of this growing ubiquity: In
1993-94, the Indian intellectual property (IP) office registered 1318
patents,203 which grew to 5978 registrations in 2014-15,204 and 15283
registrations in 2018-19.205 Designs, trademarks and copyright registrations
have also followed a similar growth trajectory.206 The business environment
aided by IP transactions can flourish only when the governing regulatory
framework is predictable and consistent regarding IP licensing
transactions.207 To achieve this objective, various stakeholders of the process
have proposed ameliorations and adjustments to the international licensing
framework.208
Presently, the domestic regimes governing the regulation of IP licensing
are dominated by an intersection of many distinct legal rules, including
competition law, bankruptcy law, contract law, labor laws and consumer
protection laws.209 Section 365 of the American Bankruptcy Code is an
example of this mosaic of interconnected domestic regulations which alter
200. Id.; see Indrajit Dube, National Report for India, in EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN INSOLVENCY
LAW: A GLOBAL GUIDE (Jason Chuah & Eugenio Vaccari eds., 2019).
201. Tosato, supra note 25, at 1255-56.
202. Id. at 1254.
203. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDIA ANNUAL REPORT 2002-2003 OF THE CONTROLLER GENERAL
OF
PATENTS, DESIGNS, TRADE Marks AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS at 7,
https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAnnualReport/1_43_1_annual-report-02-03.pdf.
204. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDIA ANNUAL REPORT 2018-2019 OF THE CONTROLLER GENERAL
OF
PATENTS, DESIGNS, TRADE MARKS AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS at 8,
https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/Images/pdf/IP_India_Annual_Report_2019_Eng.pdf.
205. Id. at 8.
206. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INDIA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 204, at 8-13.
207. Werra, supra note 22, at 451.
208. See id. at 451; Eleonora Rosati, The Wittem Group and the Project of a European Copyright
Code, 5 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 862 (2010).
209. Werra, supra note 22.
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the IP licensing landscape.210 This is further complicated by the marked
divergences between different national insolvency regimes.211 The issues
which were discussed in Samsung v. Jaffe are a prime example of how these
marked divergences affect the interaction between domestic insolvency
regimes.
UNCITRAL has also expressed interest in addressing the legal
framework responsible for initiating, maintaining, and concluding effective
IP licensing transactions.212 The UNCITRAL General Assembly in July
2013, requested its secretariat to prepare a study to “identify the desirability
and feasibility of the Commission preparing a legal text with a view to
removing specific obstacles to international trade in the context of
intellectual property licensing practices.”213 In July 2015, in its 48th Session,
the Commission reiterated that they might consider the viability of a license
on IP licensing after a colloquium or expert group meeting.214 However, none
of these formulations have assumed finality. 215
B. TREATMENT OF IP LICENSES IN THE INDIAN INSOLVENCY REGIME
i. During Liquidation
IBC, 2016 empowers a bankruptcy trustee to disclaim any onerous
property of the bankrupt estate.216 The right to disclaim onerous property first
appeared in English insolvency law in 1869.217 Section 23 of the UK
Bankruptcy Act, 1869 provided that a disclaimer would determine the
relationship. Any person injured by the disclaimer would be deemed a
creditor of the bankrupt to the extent of such injury, and may accordingly
prove the same as a debt under bankruptcy.218 A similar description of a
disclaimer can be traced back to the present iteration of the English219 and
the Indian insolvency law.
210. Derek I. Hunter, Nobody Likes Rejection: Protecting IP Licenses in Cross-Border Insolvency
Notes, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1167–96 (2015).
211. Tosato, supra note 25; Werra, supra note 22.
212. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. of Working Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the Work
of Its Fourteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/667 (2008), https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/667; Int. Trade
L. Comm’n, Rep. Of Working Group VI (Security Interests) on the work of its fifteenth session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/670 (2009), https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/670.
213. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, ¶ 273, U.N. Doc.
A/65/17
(2010),
https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V10/556/48/PDF/V1055648.pdf?OpenElement.
214. U.N. Secretariat, Planned and possible future work, Note by the Secretariat, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/841 (Apr. 22, 2015).
215. Tosato, supra note 25, at 1257.
216. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, § 160 (2016); Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
(Liquidation Process) Regulation (2016); see MAKHIJA, supra note 95, at 1325-26
217. The Bankruptcy Act of 1869, § 23 1869 (Eng.); Paul McCartney, Disclaimer of leases and its
impact: the “pecking order”, 28 CORP. RESCUE AND INSOLVENCY J. 79 (2002).
218. See Id.
219. Insolvency Act § 178, 1986 (UK); Hardinge Stanley Giffard, 17 HALSBURY’S L. OF ENG.; CO.
AND P’SHIP INSOLVENCY, 762 (2017).
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The power of a bankruptcy trustee to disclaim unprofitable contracts is
the closest enunciation to Section 365 of the American Bankruptcy Code.220
Onerous property includes any unprofitable contract or any property which
cannot be disposed of for value.221 In its present form, a disclaimer ends any
liability of the bankrupt estate arising from onerous property.222 Any person
who sustains a loss due to the disclaimer shall be deemed a creditor of the
bankrupt estate to the extent of the loss.223 Any person who claims to have
an interest in the disclaimed property can approach the NCLT challenging
the disclaimer.224 The provision allowing disclaimer is designed to reject the
performance of contracts, the maintenance of which is unprofitable and can
potentially result in depletion of the pool of assets available to a bankrupt
estate.225 A substantial difference between Section 365 of the American
Bankruptcy Code, and the power of disclaimer is that disclaimer operates
exclusively in reference to liquidation and has no bearing in cases of
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.226
Similar to the term rejection, even the term disclaimer does not have an
obvious contract law analogue. The lack of a clear mandate on the meaning
of rejection and the lack of a clear contract law analogue has been the subject
of judicial confusion and yielded “wasteful litigation, observed results and
dramatic distortions in bankruptcy law.” 227 The bankruptcy courts have
often conflated the meaning of the terms’ rejection’ and ‘termination.’ 228 A
primary example of this confusion is the case of Lubrizol v. RMF, which led
to the enactment of the IPBPA, 1988.229
Does lack of a contract law analogue mean that disclaimer can also
distort the bankruptcy law? Given the lack of substantial guidance from the
Indian judiciary, it is difficult to answer the question within the Indian
insolvency context. However, since the provision traces its lineage from the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

David Flint, Man on a Mission, 40 BUS. L. REV. 173, 174 (2019).
Frosdick v. Fox, [2017] EWHC 1737 (Ch).
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 160(3) (2016); MITTAL, supra note 21, at 1196.
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 160(4) (2016) (India).
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 163(1) (2016) (India); WORKING GROUP ON INDIVIDUAL
INSOLVENCY, Report on Bankruptcy Process: Proposing Rules and Regulations for Personal Guarantors
to Corporate Debtors, 12.13 (2019).
225. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION AND INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY BOARD OF
INDIA, supra note 1 at 202–203; Narayan Gajanan Vidvans v. Special Prints Ltd., [2020] SCC Online
NCLT 636; Akshaya Imaging Sys. Priv. Ltd. v. Sreenivasan Janakiraman, [2019] SCC Online NCLT
3652.
226. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process), 2016, Regulation 1(3) (India)
(providing that the regulations are applicable solely in a liquidation context).
227. Andrew, supra note 32 at 847; Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to
Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991); see also International Trademark Association,
Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of International Trademark Association in Sumbeam Products Inc. v.
Chicago American Manufacturing, 102 TRADEMARK REP. 1374, 1379 (2012).
228. Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077, 1082 (5th
Cir. 1994); Fisher Bros. Mgmt. Co. v. Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd. (In re Genco Shipping & Trading
Co.), 550 B.R. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Andrew, supra note 32.
229. Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, supra note 24; Hunter, supra note 210.
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English insolvency law, and given that the language applied by both statutes
is identical,230 we can rely on the interpretation of the provision by the
English insolvency courts.
In 1997, the House of Lords explained the effect of disclaimer in the
following terms:231
“Disclaimer will, inevitably, have an adverse impact on others: those with
whom the contracts were made, and those who have rights and liabilities
in respect of the property. The rights and obligations of these other persons
are to be affected as little as possible. They are to be affected only to the
extent necessary to achieve the primary object: the release of the company
from all liability. Those who are prejudiced by the loss of their rights are
entitled to prove in the winding up of the company as though they were
creditors.”

The decision of the House of Lords has assumed prominence and has
since followed and applied in multiple disputes.232 Applying the court’s
opinion in cases of intellectual property licenses, a disclaimer of an
intellectual property license during the liquidation of the licensor should only
apply to the extent of releasing the bankruptcy estate from its foregoing
obligations. The right of the licensee to continue using the licensed
intellectual property, in so far as it does not affect the foregoing interests of
the bankrupt licensor, should not be affected.
ii. During CIRP
IBC, 2016 allows a bankrupt debtor to avoid some transactions and
empowers a modification and alteration of transactions during CIRP. Since
the power of disclaimer does not extend to CIRP, this section examines the
extent up to which interference is warranted by IBC, 2016 during CIRP.
IBC, 2016 legislates avoidance powers regarding four vulnerable
transactions: preferential transactions,233 undervalued transactions,234
extortionate credit transactions235 and transactions defrauding creditors.236
The avoidance powers are a statutory acknowledgement that there may be a
considerable time period between the management of the corporate debtor
realizing that the corporate entity is heading towards insolvency and
insolvency proceedings being initiated. During this time, the management
may be inclined to strategically place a few creditors in a comparatively

230. Mohan and Gupta, supra note 195.
231. Hindcastle Ltd. v. Barbara Attenborough Assoc. Ltd., [1997] AC 70.
232. Shaw v. Doleman, [2009] EWCA Civ 904; RVB Investments Ltd. v. Bibby, [2013] EWHC 65
(Ch); Groveholt Ltd. v. Hughes, [2005] EWCA Civ 897.
233. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 43 (2016) (India).
234. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 45 (2016) (India).
235. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 50 (2016) (India).
236. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code § 49 (2016) (India).
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advantageous position than the other.237 To ensure that the interests of
creditors are sufficiently protected, “the bankruptcy law allows the ex-post
alignment of incentives between factually insolvent debtors and their
creditors.”238 These avoidance powers are essentially “retrospective
adjustment of pre-petition transactions” and allow a bankrupt debtor to claw
back the assets that the corporate debtor’s management has surreptitiously
distributed.239 Avoidance provisions are a part of many modern insolvency
laws.240
However, the avoidance powers apply to a very limited set of corporate
transactions and multiple statutory guidelines limit the scope of their
application.241 For example, preferential and undervalued transactions made
in the ordinary course of business cannot be avoided.242 Further, if a
transaction was entered into two years prior to the initiation of insolvency
proceedings, it cannot be avoided.243 Apart from these myriad statutory
guidelines, avoidance powers are designed to counter fraudulent transactions
and fraudulent preference to a specific creditor or group of creditors.244 The
Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee further limited the scope of these
provisions when they submitted that vulnerable transactions “fall within the
category of wrongful or fraudulent trading by the entity or constitute
unauthorised use of capital by the management.”245 Therefore, while
avoidance transactions allow interference with pre-petition transactions, they
are limited to a very specialized segment of corporate transactions.
This is in stark difference between avoidance powers, and Section 365
of the American bankruptcy code. This position is further buttressed by the
fact that the American bankruptcy code explicitly legislates a set of
avoidance powers.246 Compared to avoidance powers, the mandate of Section
365 is very far extensive and far reaching. It allows the reduction of
businesses’ prospective liabilities, which can, in turn, increase the value of
the underlying assets. For example, if a patent licensing agreement is onerous
237. IMF Legal Dept., “Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues” 34 (1999); AYUSH
J. RAJANI, KHUSHBOO RAJANI & ALKA ADATIA, INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY IN INDIA - LAW AND
PRACTICE 18.4-18.8 (2nd ed. 2021).
238. Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez, The Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy Transactions: An Economic and
Comparative Approach, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 711, 713 (2018).
239. Gurrea-Martinez, supra note 238, at 711.; For a history of avoidance provisions see BATRA,
supra note 93, at 535–536.
240. JL Westbrook, Looking the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019, 1021 (2007).
241. Mohan and Gupta, supra note 195.
242. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, §43(3), 45(2) (2016) (India).
243. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, §46(1)(ii), 43(4)(b), 50(1) (2016) (India); Anup Kumar,
Resolution Professional of Shivakal Developers Pvt Ltd v BDR Builder & Developers Pvt Ltd Company
Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 679 of 2018 (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal); MAKHIJA,
supra note 95, at 985; Makhija Ashish, Case Digest on Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
(Bloomsbury 2020) 2.317-2.320.
244. BANKRUPTCY LAW REFORMS COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 5.5.7.
245. Id. at § 5.5.7.
246. 11 U.S.C. § 548, 547, 544(b); RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL ET AL., DEBT RESTRUCTURING 27–
34 (1st ed. 2011).
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of the option of the licensor, it can potentially reduce the saleable value of
the underlying patent. Reducing the onerous licensing arrangements can
therefore help a licensor assume a better value of the IP asset. This position
has been approved by administrative committees, both in India, and
internationally.
In 2005, a committee empowered by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
explicitly aligned with this position. The Committee noted that provisions
which provide for interference “would assist in achieving the objectives of
the insolvency process. The power is necessary to facilitate taking
appropriate business and other decisions including those directed at
containing rise in liabilities and enhancing the value of assets.”247 In 2016,
even the World Bank noted that “to achieve the objectives of the insolvency
proceedings, on the system should allow interference with the contract where
both parties are not fully perform their obligations.” 248
Therefore, a resolution professional during CIRP should be allowed to
interfere with onerous pre-petition contractual arrangements. The legislature
can either, extend the power of disclaimer to CIRP proceedings, or a specific
set of provisions modelled on section 365 of the American Bankruptcy Code
should be enacted. Such amendments should take cognizance of their
possible interaction with intellectual property licenses, and specific
protection should be legislated where required.249

V. IP LICENSES DURING INDIAN INSOLVENCY AND THE NEED FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ENQUIRY

Having understood the Model Law and the judicial discourse related to
treatment of IP licenses in cross-border insolvency, the authors now study
the issues highlighted by the Samsung v. Jaffe dispute within the Indian
Insolvency regime. What happens if an Indian insolvency professional
approaches an American bankruptcy court for recognition of Indian
insolvency proceedings, and administration of American IP assets?
Before addressing this question, it must be underlined that unlike
American bankruptcy jurisprudence, the Indian legislature and judiciary has
not addressed the concerns of IP licensing in bankruptcy. There is little to no
guidance on the subject, and the findings of the authors are largely tentative.
Addressing whether an Indian insolvency professional would be able to
secure unencumbered access to administration of American IP assets would
largely depend on two questions: Firstly, which proceedings are sought to be
recognized? If the Indian proceedings sought to be recognized are liquidation
proceedings, then the statutory instruction on the subject is largely clear. A
247. JAMSHED J. IRANI, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW 13 (2005).
248. Principles of Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, THE WORLD BANK 24 (2016),
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/518861467086038847/pdf/106399-WP-REVISEDPUBLIC-ICR-Principle-Final-Hyperlinks-revised-Latest.pdf.
249. For further discussion see Mohan and Gupta, supra note 195.
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disclaimer, in most circumstances, should not affect the ability of the
licensee to continue using the licensed IP. Alternatively, if a corporate
insolvency resolution proceeding (CIRP) is sought to be recognized, the
issue of rejection loses relevance. As our analysis indicates, the power of an
insolvency professional to interfere with IP licenses during CIRP is very
specialized. None of the discussed powers are comparable to Section 365 of
the American Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, in either of these instances a
licensee’s ability to continue using a bankrupt licensor’s IP, should not be
affected.
However, owing to the lack of explicit legislative guidance on the
subject, this conclusion can be easily dismantled. One such instance, can
arise when American IP rights are subjected to exclusive licensing
agreements. The law on disclaimer explicitly states that a disclaimer shall
affect the rights of the licensee “so far as is necessary for the purpose of
releasing the corporate debtor, and the property of corporate debtor.”250 A
licensing agreement which includes an exclusivity covenant limits the
licensor’s ability to monetize and exploit the subject IP right. Such a
covenant can create subsisting and continuing liabilities. It is possible that a
disclaimer may frustrate the exclusivity requirement of a licensee. Such
treatment would be in stark contrast with the American Law on the subject.
Section 365(n)(1)(b), explicitly provides that an exclusivity covenant can be
enforced by the licensee if he decides to retain the license post rejection.251
Therefore, while the Indian insolvency regime is largely compliant with the
protections offered by Section 365(n), there can be nuanced situations where
this compliance would be called into question.
The Indian insolvency regime is on the precipice of adopting crossborder insolvency regulations. In August 2021, the Secretary to the Ministry
of Corporate Affairs informed the Standing Committee on Finance that “The
cross-border insolvency is on the priority list and we are working on it. Very
soon we will be drafting the legislative part.”252 The Ministry and any
affiliated bodies should remain mindful of the possible impediments to the
implementation of cross border insolvency regulations. The present study
underlines that there is a glaring gap in judicial, legislative, and
administrative direction regarding the treatment of IP licenses in bankruptcy.
This gap can lead to problematic conclusions when cross border insolvency
regulations are put to the test. An administrative study should identify the
potential problems of IP licensing in bankruptcy, and legislative
interventions should be made to fill the gap in existing law.

250. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, Reg. 10.
251. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(b) (1992); See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31.
252. STANDING COMMITTEE ON FINANCE & MINISTRY OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS, IMPLEMENTATION
OF INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY AODE – PITFALLS AND SOLUTIONS 34 (2021) at 18.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The insolvency law and its intersection with intellectual property
exploitation reveals a curious deficiency: There is virtually no international
guidance on the treatment of intellectual property licenses during
bankruptcy. Some jurisdictions such as America have substantively dealt
with this issue, while others such as India provide no discernible guidelines,
legislatively or otherwise. Such marked divergences in insolvency
legislations of different countries, can result in problematic conclusions. An
area where the lack of such harmonization becomes an important concern is
cross-border insolvency. The issue manifested itself in the Qimonda dispute,
where the intersection of American and German insolvency law resulted in
a dramatically different treatment between the American and the German
creditors. The authors underlined the importance of the Qimonda guidelines,
and studied them within the context of the Indian insolvency regime. The
study revealed that the treatment afforded to intellectual property licensees
by the Indian and the American bankruptcy law is largely in compliance with
one another. However, owing to the lack of any judicial, administrative, or
legislative guidance, or any policy-based motivations within the Indian
insolvency law, this conclusion is only tentative. There can be many
situations which can potentially disrupt this compliance. One such instance
that the authors highlight is the possible repugnancy between the Indian and
the American bankruptcy law in relation to exclusive intellectual property
licenses.
The Indian insolvency regime is on the cusp of adopting cross-border
insolvency regulations. The CBIRC explicitly acknowledges that there can
be possible repugnancies between the insolvency laws applicable in
concurrent proceedings. The Committee suggested that the insolvency
professionals, with guidance from NCLT, can enter into protocols that
accommodate the possible statutory inconsistencies between different
regimes.253 However, without any clarity on how Indian insolvency law
treats IP licenses, the approach that can be taken for preparing, regulating
and enforcing protocols would remain largely speculative in this particular
respect. Further, given the express acknowledgement of the Indian
legislative bodies on the international character of insolvency proceedings,
it is imperative for the Indian insolvency law to regulate the treatment of
intellectual property licenses in insolvency. Therefore, the authors suggest
administrative inquiry of the issue, in order to avoid any confusion in cases
of cross-border insolvency where the treatment of intellectual property
licenses constitutes a substantial concern.

253. INSOLVENCY BANKRUPTCY BOARD OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INDIVIDUAL
INSOLVENCY, supra note 224, at 18.

212

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

***

Vol. 18:2

